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Ulrike Davy, Lutz Leisering 
 
EU pension policies : changing paradigms 
 
Two fundamental tensions are at the heart of the EU: the tension between market 
liberalization and social integration, that is, between ‘economic Europe’ and ‘social 
Europe’; and the tension between the national level (policies by member states) and 
the supranational level (EU policies) in a multi-level system of government. Most 
conflicts in the EU revolve around these two tensions and much of EU activities can 
be seen as ways of reconciling the poles (the national and the supranational; the eco-
nomic and the social). The two lines of conflict may be related, e.g. when a country 
seeks to shield its highly developed welfare state against ‘neoliberal’ inroads by EU 
agencies, then the national level is seen as ‘social’ in a positive sense while the EU 
level is seen as ‘economic’ in a negative sense. Or vice versa, people may call for 
more social activities by EU agencies to fight economic insecurities of liberalized 
markets in their home countries.  
Pension policy is also affected by the two lines of conflict. Some scholars expect an 
increasing significance of the supranational level and of the ‘social’ in supranational 
pension policy, that is, they assume a formative influence of the EU on the member 
states, and, at the same time, a strong ‘social’ orientation of EU policies. In the early 
1990s, Rainer Pitschas, for example — an academic and expert in administrative and 
social law — had a clear vision about an emerging pension policy promoted at the 
EU level by EU institutions. Pitschas (1993: 97) pointed out that the phenomenon of 
demographic ageing, which affects all European countries, could cause severe social 
conflicts in mid- or long-term perspective, and that these conflicts would probably be 
dealt with by EU institutions: “If, by the year 2025, about 17% of Europe’s population 
will be above 65 years of age, this is most likely to influence the development of a 
genuine European pension policy” (transl. U.D./L.L.). In 2002, Eberhard Eichenhofer 
— another expert in social law — concurred: Social protection, so he said, was by 
now a matter covered by EU law; the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms included an 
individual right to pension provision: “This right has to be implemented by commu-
nity law” (Eichenhofer, 2002: 329; transl. U.D./L.L.). Eichenhofer added that, today, 
traces of social policy were also to be found in other EU policy areas, such as finan-
cial policy, monetary policy, or the interpretation of the freedoms guaranteed by the 
EC Treaty. 
This article will take these remarks as a starting point. The remarks imply that social 
policy grew stronger and stronger on EU level. They also imply that there is a genu-
ine EU pension policy in the making. The article will concentrate on three questions. 
First: What are the legal powers of the EU with respect to the three pillars of pension 
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systems, the statutory or public schemes (first pillar), the occupational pension 
schemes (second pillar), and the personal or individual schemes (third pillar)?1 Sec-
ond: What is the role of social policy within the framework established by the EC 
Treaty? Is there a paradigm specifically encouraging the emergence of a genuine EU 
pension policy? Third: What are the concepts determining EU pension policy? How 
did the Community act? My analysis will be based on legal documents and policy 
papers authored by EU institutions, primarily by the Commission and the Council of 
the EU. 
In brief, the answer to the first question is: Legal powers of EU institutions with re-
spect to social protection2 have always been and still are very limited. The answer to 
the second question is: Over time, actors on EU level favoured differing paradigms 
pertaining to the function of social policy. The prevalent paradigm of the 1950s was 
different from the paradigm prevailing in the 1980s and 1990s, and that again is dif-
ferent from the current one: There has been a shift from liberalism to a ‘social’ con-
cept, and another shift back to neo-liberalism as the currently dominating form of 
liberal thinking. The answer to the third question is: As it now stands, EU pension 
policy draws heavily upon neo-liberal thinking. Social protection policy is clearly 
influenced by economic policy, and not the other way round. 
1 Pension policies before Lisbon: Separating pillars 
1.1 Legislative powers of the Community in the social field 
Basically, there are three types of authorisations embodied in Community law that 
relate to social protection issues: authorisations specifically concerned with social 
policy, authorisations relating to the four market freedoms, and the residuary au-
thorisation under Article 308 (formerly: Article 235) of the Treaty. 
__________ 
 
 
 
1 In language used by EU institutions, the term “pension system” refers to a complete set of arrange-
ments for the provision of pensions (“pension schemes”), including public and private schemes. For 
details see Commission, 2001b: 3 and Commission, 2000c: 2. 
2 The term “social protection”, as used in EU documents, is broader than “social security systems”. 
The term “social protection” relates to certain social risks (such as old age, retirement, the death of a 
provider, disability, sickness, maternity, unemployment, care for the frail), and it covers at least sys-
tems of social security and systems providing for social assistance. For details see, e.g., Commission, 
2003c: 3; Commission, 1995: 1b; Council Recommendation of 24 June 1992 on common criteria concer-
ning sufficient resources and social assistance in social protection systems, Official Journal (O.J.) 1992 
L 245/46; Council Recommendation of 27 July 1992 on the convergence of social protection objectives 
and policies, O.J. 1992 L 245/49. 
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Most significantly, legislative powers derive from the title of the EC Treaty explicitly 
dedicated to social policy. In its 1957 version, the Treaty3 already stipulated that the 
Community’s task was not confined to establishing a common market and to pro-
moting economic activities, but also extended to an accelerated raising of the stan-
dard of living of Europe’s people (Article 2). However, Member States could not 
agree to raise the standard of living of Europe’s people by creating Community pow-
ers with a view to social protection. Under the 1957 Treaty, the Commission was 
simply authorised to promote “close co-operation between Member States in the so-
cial field” (Article 118 para. 1), and to do so “by making studies, delivering opinions 
and arranging consultations” (Article 118 para. 2). Things did not really change when 
the 1986 European Single Act4 entered into force. The Council was then authorised to 
adopt Directives with respect to the health and safety of workers (Article 118a). ‘So-
cial security’ or ‘social protection’ were still exempt from Community legislation. 
Things changed when the 1992 Social Policy Agreement5 was incorporated into 
Community law by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam.6 Since then, one of the Commu-
nity’s tasks is to promote “a high level of employment and of social protection” as 
well as “economic and social cohesion” (Article 2). The Council was given new legis-
lative powers, inter alia, in the field of “social security and social protection of work-
ers” (Article 118 paras. 1 and 3).7 Yet, the Council was confined to adopting Direc-
tives by unanimous vote and to supporting and complementing the activities of the 
Member States in this field (Article 118 para. 1).8 The 2001 Treaty of Nice9 did not lift 
any of these constraints, though the wording and the structure of the provisions have 
indeed been changed slightly (Article 137 para. 1 and 2). Legislative action still re-
quires unanimity and may not aim at full harmonisation of national social protection 
systems (Streinz, 2005: 38). The Commission never made use of these powers. 
Second, some legislative powers in the area of social policy and of pension provision 
in particular relate to the freedoms guaranteed by EU law, especially to the freedom 
of movement of workers, the freedom to provide services, and the freedom of mo-
__________ 
 
 
 
3 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957. 
4 European Single Act, The Hague, 28 February 1986, O.J. 1987 L 169. 
5 Agreement on social policy concluded between the Member States of the European Community with 
the exception of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 7 February 1992, O.J. 1992 
C 191/91. 
6 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related Acts, Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, O.J. 1997 C 340. 
7 Article 137 para. 3 of the consolidated version of the EC Treaty. 
8 Ibd., Article 137 para. 1. 
9 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, O.J. 2001 C 80/1. 
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vement of capital: In 1957, Member States had already agreed that the freedom of 
movement would be worthless unless the right to reside and to take up employment 
in another Member State was backed by provisions ensuring the portability of rights 
acquired under social security schemes: Who would migrate to another Member 
State if acquired social rights were lost by the pure fact of leaving the home Member 
State? The Community was authorised to act accordingly (today: Article 42 of the 
Treaty). The freedom to provide services and the freedom of movement of capital 
include, in combination with other Articles (such as Articles 94 and 95 of the Treaty), 
the power to complete the internal market with respect to all sorts of services ren-
dered by institutions managing occupational or individual pension schemes. Third, 
legislative powers may derive from Article 308 of the Treaty, whereby the Council is 
authorised to act unanimously if such action — although not explicitly permitted — 
proves necessary to attain one of the Treaty’s objectives (residual legislative power). 
1.2 Legislative action with respect to old age security 
These Community powers indeed prompted legislation with respect to old age pro-
vision, long before the Community initiated the Lisbon process in the Spring of 2000. 
However, Community action remained piecemeal. Community action was not based 
on a comprehensive approach relating or connecting the three pillars of pension pro-
vision to each other. On the contrary, statutory, occupational and personal pension 
schemes were dealt with separately: 
Regulation 1408/7110 aimed at co-ordinating social security schemes in the case of 
cross-border-movement of workers, self-employed, students, or pensioners. Under 
that Regulation, Member States are obliged to accept periods of membership in 
schemes of other Member States as if those periods were periods under their own 
laws, at least with regard to the acquisition of pension rights.11 And Member States 
are obliged to ensure the payment of benefits to persons residing in another Member 
State; States are not allowed to suspend payments or to reduce the amount.12 The Re-
gulation also contains rules on the calculation of the retirement benefits based on 
pension rights acquired in several Member States. But: Regulation 1408/71 is con-
cerned with statutory schemes only. 
__________ 
 
 
 
10 Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to em-
ployed persons and their families moving within the Community, O.J. 1971 L 149/2, as amended by 
Regulation (EC) No. 631/2004 of 31 March 2004, O.J. 2004 L 100/1. 
11 Article 45 of the Regulation. 
12 Ibd., Article 10. 
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Occupational pension schemes were covered by a 1986 Directive13 prohibiting dis-
crimination on account of sex, especially with regard to the conditions of access to 
such schemes, the obligation to make contributions, the retirement age, the calcula-
tion of benefits, and the conditions relating to the duration of benefits.14 Remarkably, 
the Directive still accepts some gender differences in the level of benefits if the differ-
ences are justified on actuarial grounds.15 When called upon to interpret the principle 
of equal pay (today: Article 141 of the Treaty) in the context of occupational pensions, 
the position of the European Court of Justice was clear and rather uncompromising: 
Part-time workers must not be excluded from access to the schemes. Occupational 
pension rights qualify as pay under Article 141; rules restricting the access to the 
schemes to full-time employees (indirectly) discriminate against women.16 With re-
spect to retirement age and the requirements for a survivor’s benefit, states or private 
actors are not allowed to differentiate according to sex.17 The application of differing 
actuarial principles does not violate Treaty obligations if it (only) pertains to the cal-
culation of the employers’ contributions.18 
The most important categories of personal pensions were covered by several Life 
Assurance Directives.19 These Directives primarily aim at facilitating the freedom to 
provide services: It was supposed to become easier for assurance companies to oper-
ate throughout all Member States, and, for individuals, it was supposed to become 
easier to take out a policy with a company not established in their home country. In 
order to achieve this, the Directives require that the taking up of a life assurance bu-
__________ 
 
 
 
13 Council Directive 86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes, O.J. 1986 L 225/40, as amen-
ded by Council Directive 96/97/EC of 20 December 1996, O.J. 1997 L 46/20. 
14 Article 6(1) of the Directive. 
15 Ibd., Article 6(1)(h)–(i), Article 9(c). 
16 See, e.g., Court of Justice, judgement of 13 May 1986, Bilka C-170/84, 1986 ECR 1607; Court of Jus-
tice, judgement of 10 February 2000, Deutsche Telekom C-234/96, 2000 ECR I 799. 
17 See, e.g., Court of Justice, judgement of 17 May 1990, C-262/88 Barber, 1990 ECR I 1889; Court of 
Justice, judgement of 9 October 2001, C-379/99 Pensionskasse für die Angestellten der Barmer Ersatz-
kasse VVaG, 2001 ECR I 7275. 
18 See, e.g., Court of Justice, judgement of 28 September 1994, C-200/91 Coloroll, 1994 ECR I 4389. 
19 First Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March 1979 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct life assurance, 
O.J. 1979 L 63/1; Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990 on the coordination of laws, re-
gulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions to 
facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC, 
O.J. 1990 L 330/50; Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directives 
79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC (third life assurance Directive), O.J. 1992 L 360/1. Finally: Directive 
2002/83/EC of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance, O.J. 2002 L 345/1. 
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siness be based on an authorisation, but on one authorisation only, namely the au-
thorisation by the home Member State of the company which is then deemed valid 
throughout the Community; other Member States are obliged to recognise that au-
thorisation. In turn, the home Member State is required to supervise the companies 
according to some specified ‘prudential rules’ relating to technical provisions, in-
vestment, insolvency margins, winding-up, etc. Those common standards are 
thought to promote the mutual recognition of companies. 
It is quite apparent that the approach of the 1980s and 1990s entailed major gaps 
(Commission, 1991; Commission, 1995; Commission, 1997b). First: Community law 
did not touch upon the aim and the functions of pension systems. That was entirely 
left to the interpretation of the Member States. Second: Community law did not deal 
with barriers to the freedom of movement of persons caused by occupational pension 
systems. Long vesting periods or methods for the evaluation of accrued rights, which 
are detrimental to early leavers, certainly do not encourage workers to take up em-
ployment in another Member State. Yet, the Council did not act.20 Third: The Com-
munity did not act upon the obstacles created by divergent national tax systems: If 
contributions made to pension schemes are not tax deductible unless the scheme is 
established in that Member State, the schemes established in other Member States are 
clearly disadvantaged. Who would like to join them? Fourth: While the market for 
life assurances has indeed been harmonised, there were no such rules for pension 
funds. That meant: It was very difficult, often even impossible, for employees to join 
a scheme established in another Member State. And: National legal provisions on 
how to invest seriously interfered with the free movement of capital since pension 
fund managers were not free to choose the form of their investment. 
The piecemeal architecture crumbled when the Community moved to re-define the 
role of social policy within the whole spectrum of Community policies in the late 
1990s. 
__________ 
 
 
 
20 Some Member States claimed that portability of occupational pension rights would clearly under-
mine the whole point of these pensions schemes. Occupational pension rights were primarily meant to 
respond to the loyalty of employees; once they were gone, the employer was free from all responsibili-
ties. Other Member States claimed that occupational pension schemes were basically a matter for col-
lective bargaining of both sides of industry; neither the Community nor governments should interfere. 
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2 Shifts of paradigms 
2.1 From a liberal to a ‘social’ concept 
The 1957 version of the EC Treaty was certainly inspired by liberal thinking. While 
Member States could easily agree on the need of improving the standard of living for 
workers (Article 2, Article 117 para. 1), there was no consensus that social standards 
should be harmonised (Currall and Pipkorn, 1991: 3283). France favoured harmonisa-
tion because she saw her industry disadvantaged by the comparatively high social 
expenditures French employers had to shoulder. Germany objected (Birkelbach, 
1957). According to Germany, those fears were hardly based on facts. Germany con-
tended that it was — at that point — not possible to foresee whether some Member 
States would be disadvantaged by differences in social security schemes: A disad-
vantage in one social area might be compensated by an advantage in another area. 
And any case, States would be able to compensate disadvantages through adjust-
ments in the exchange rates. In the end, Germany’s position prevailed. The compro-
mise that was finally found assumed that harmonisation of social systems would 
mainly result from the smooth functioning of the common market. Legislative action 
would not prove necessary. The Social Fund was designed to (indirectly) care for 
those who would indeed be crowded out of their businesses and jobs. The Fund was 
supposed to support Member States in their efforts to improve the employment op-
portunities for workers (Articles 123 through 128 of the 1957 Treaty). 
For decades, commentators complained about the liberal bias of the Treaty (Schulte, 
1990; Currall and Pipkorn, 1991: 3274; Pitschas, 1993: 93, 95; Joussen, 2000). Integra-
tion was perceived as being mainly linked to economic activities, the notion of the 
common market as being mainly related to business men and bankers. 
The ‘social dimension’ became an issue when the Community launched the concept 
of the internal market. In 1988, the Commission vigorously emphasised: “The social 
dimension . . . is a fundamental component of this project” (Commission, 1988: Fo-
reword). The Commission added that the internal market was not only about streng-
thening economic growth (in the face of emerging global markets), but also about a 
fair share-out of the advantages deriving from the internal market. The idea of a so-
cial dimension equal in rank with other priorities of the Community (such as eco-
nomic integration, monetary integration, financial integration) was confirmed by the 
1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights21 and, with respect to all 
__________ 
 
 
 
21 COM(89) 471 final. 
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Member States, by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam22 that finally seemed to establish a 
European social model. 
Political consensus on the social dimension of the internal market was broad: Even 
the most fierce supporters of the ‘internal market‘ knew that the implementation of 
the concept would be costly for some branches of industry, and many thought that 
the process of re-structuring the national economies would be easier if there was a 
strong national social safety net (supported by the European Social Fund).23 Even the 
most fierce supporters of the ‘internal market’ knew that there was a wide-spread 
fear that social standards might be threatened by economic rationality. Many thought 
that the legitimacy of the Union might suffer unless there was a firm commitment to 
certain social standards.24 Others again thought that now was a perfect time for in-
corporating some important ‘social’ elements into Community law.25 The ‘social di-
mension’ was supposed to signal that the Community was finally ready to accept 
responsibility for a fair distribution of chances and wealth, and thus act as a safe-
guard of ‘social’ ideas. 
In the 1990s, the language of Community documents indeed changed. The Commis-
sion and the European Parliament referred to economic and social integration as se-
parate, but equally important Community goals (Commission, 1994: 2; Commission, 
1995; Commission, 1997a).26 Despite high unemployment rates and the growing belief 
that a high level of social security expenditures might in fact hamper employment, 
the Commission endorsed the principle of solidarity, although with a concession 
(Commission, 1994: 4; Commission, 1997a 5): The Commission contended that, in the 
past, solidarity as promoted by the Member States had basically been devoted to re-
place the incomes of large inactive groups in society. Therefore, solidarity had been 
primarily passive solidarity. Now, the emphasis ought to be on active solidarity, 
meaning that emphasis ought to be on measures enabling people to re-integrate into 
the labour market (such as training or instruments avoiding financial disincentives to 
__________ 
 
 
 
22 Supra note 6. 
23 Commission, 1988: 10, 14, 17. 
24 Corbett, 1993: 198 (Conference of Parliaments of the European Community), 202 (European People’s 
Party), 235 (proposal of the Commission on the social dimension and the development of human re-
sources), 324 (Luxembourg European Council, June 1991, Presidency conclusions). 
25 Corbett, 1993: 159 (Danish Government Memorandum), 165 (Opinion of the Commission). 
26 See also the 1996 French Memorandum on a European social model; Resolution of the Council of 2 
December 1996 on the role of social protection systems in the fight against unemployment, O.J. 1996 C 
386/3; Resolution of the European Parliament of 6 November 1997 on the Commission communica-
tion on modernising and improving social protection in the European Union [COM(97) 102], O.J. 1997 
C 358/51. 
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take up work).27 In the mid-1990s, the Commission was also quite optimistic that hig-
her employment rates would ease the pressure on social protection systems: Financ-
ing of the systems depended on jobs; thus, the creation of jobs was to be given high-
est priority (Commission, 1994: 4).28 The active ‘social’ approach eventually inspired 
the European Employment Strategy introduced by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam 
and the 1998 Luxembourg process29 defining common objectives and means with re-
spect to (national) employment policies (Kohl and Vahlpahl, 2004). 
2.2 From a ‘social’ concept to neo-liberal restructuring 
Paradigm shifted again around the year 2000. In the late 1990s, economic indicators 
had improved slightly on EU average.30 Unemployment dropped, employment rates 
increased, growth rates increased. Nonetheless, at EU level, expectations were not 
very high: The Lisbon European Council noted that the employment rate (then 61% 
on average) was still too low, especially among women and older workers, that the 
services sector was underdeveloped, and that European countries were facing a seri-
ous skills gap, especially with regard to information technology.31 Determined to im-
prove economic data further, the Union committed itself to a new strategic goal for 
the next decade, namely to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world (Lisbon process).32 The employment rate was to be 
raised to 70% by 2010, the employment rate of women from an average of 51% to 
60%, and the rate for older workers to 50% (Lisbon targets).33 The Barcelona summit 
added another goal: Until 2010, the effective average retirement age was to increase 
by 5 years.34  
Around that time, actors on EU level apparently became convinced that economic 
growth and a rise in employment rates would not suffice to make social protection 
systems financially sustainable. That conviction was strengthened by the fact, that 
economic growth slowed down between 2001 and 2004. Community documents be-
__________ 
 
 
 
27 See also Resolution of the Council, supra note 26; Resolution of the European Parliament of 19 Febru-
ary 1997 on the Commission Communication [COM(95) 466], O.J. 1997 C 85/63. 
28 See also Resolution of the European Parliament of 14 March 1997 on the Commission’s report on the 
demographic situation in the European Union [COM(96) 60], O.J. 1997 C 115/238; Commission 1999c: 
10. 
29 Extraordinary Luxembourg European Council, November 1997, Presidency Conclusions. 
30 Vienna European Council, December 1998, Presidency Conclusions, para. 28; Nice European Coun-
cil, December 2000, Presidency Conclusions, para. 17. 
31 Lisbon European Council, March 2000, Presidency Conclusions, para. 4. 
32 Ibd., para. 5. 
33 Ibd., para. 30; Stockholm European Council, March 2001, Presidency conclusions, para. 9. 
34 Barcelona European Council, March 2002, Presidency Conclusions, para. 32. 
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gan to use the metaphor of a triangle linking social policy to employment policy on 
the one hand and to economic policy on the other.35 While some documents still as-
serted that these policy fields were mutually reinforcing,36 the debate on the ‘mod-
ernisation of social protection’ — initiated by the Commission in 199937 — quickly 
revealed that the essential elements of social policy had changed. There was no men-
tion of securing a fair share-out of wealth any longer. A high level of living standard 
was not listed amongst the key priorities. Instead, actors indicated that ‘modernising 
the European social model’ was a euphemism for re-evaluating a concept that had 
been developed under very different circumstances (Commission, 2000a). The new 
motto read: Growth is a prerequisite for social cohesion.38 Since social cohesion re-
quires growth, the main function of social policy is to support economic growth to 
the greatest possible extent.39 To support growth, social policy is supposed to make 
work pay (strand of the active welfare state), to contain public expenditures, espe-
cially in the field of pensions and health care (strand of adapting social protection), 
and to prevent poverty (strand of combating social exclusion).40 These are the three 
basic essentials of a “highly competitive market economy” (Commission, 2005a: 2), a 
concept that reflects once again the key elements of neo-liberal thinking: Traditional 
social policy is perceived as being at odds with economic policy, mainly because so-
cial protection systems are too burdensome and because they distort the efficient 
__________ 
 
 
 
35 Commission, 2000a: 6; Resolution of the European Parliament of 25 October 2000 on the Commis-
sion communication on the social policy agenda [COM(2000) 379], O.J. 2000 C 197/180; Commission, 
2001b: 9; Commission, 2003c: 3; High Level Group, 2004a: 30. 
36 Commission, 2000a: 6; Stockholm European Council, March 2001, Presidency Conclusions, para. 2; 
Commission, 2001b: 9. 
37 Commission, 1999c. 
38 See, e.g., Commission, 2000a: 6: “Sustained economic growth with low inflation and sound public 
finances is crucial for increasing employment and social cohesion”. See also Brussels European Coun-
cil, March 2005, Presidency Conclusions: “[The] European social model [is] based on the quest for full 
employment and greater social cohesion” (para. 29). “Raising employment rates and extending wor-
king life, coupled with reform of social protection systems, provide the best way of maintaining the 
present level of social protection” (para. 30). 
39 The Brussels European Council, March 2003, Presidency Conclusions, para. 43, urged Member Sta-
tes to focus, inter alia, on “reforms in tax and benefit systems and their interaction, so that they pro-
mote participation in the labour force and tackle poverty and unemployment traps, and increase la-
bour demand and participation, in particular of those with low earning prospects”. According to High 
Level Group, 2004a: 7, the next social agenda is supposed to “improve the contribution of social policy 
to growth, competitiveness and social cohesion by developing lifelong learning, modernising work 
organisation and reforming social protection”. 
40 Brussels European Council, March 2003, Presidency Conclusions, paras. 41–52; Brussels European 
Council, March 2005, Presidency Conclusions, para. 31. 
 
 
 
11 
functioning of the labour market.41 Since state provision is not viable, individuals are 
expected to gain confidence in their own ability to manage crises.42 
3 Pension policies after Lisbon: Integrating pillars 
3.1 Changing issues of social policy 
When the ‘social dimension’ of the internal market was high on the political agenda, 
Community documents recommended that workers ought to be provided with a re-
tirement income reflecting their standard of living in a reasonable manner in accor-
dance with their participation in social security schemes.43 Ten years later, all impor-
tant actors on EU level concentrated on demographic ageing and the problems cau-
sed by this phenomenon: 
The Commission released data indicating dire predicaments to ensue: Due to in-
creases in life-expectancy, low fertility rates, and the retirement of the baby boomer 
generation, the demographic dependency ratio44 was expected to rise from 49% in 
2005 to 66% in 2030,45 the average ratio of persons in retirement compared with those 
of working age to double from 24% to almost 50% in 2050.46 There was, therefore, a 
growing imbalance between the size of the working population and non-working 
population. The number of people aged between 65 and 79 was supposed to increase 
significantly after 2010 (by 37%), the number of the very elderly to increase even 
more (by 57%).47 
__________ 
 
 
 
41 See, e.g., Commission, 2000c: 2: “Population ageing will be on such a scale that, in the absence of 
appropriate reforms, it risks undermining the European social model as well as economic growth and 
stability in the European Union”; Commission, 2003f: 6: “The primary function of social protection 
institutions consists in providing security against risk and hazards of life. In fulfilling this function, tax 
and benefit programmes may have potentially distorting effects on the efficient functioning of the 
labour market.” 
42 Commission, 2005b: 3: “Through modernising social policies, the measures proposed are designed 
to enable citizens to gain confidence in their own ability to effectively manage these changes [i.e., in-
creased competition in a global context, technological development, population ageing]”. 
43 Council Recommendation of 27 July 1992 on the convergence of social protection objectives and 
policies, O.J. 1992 L 245/49, Rec. A.1.d. 
44 Ratio of the population aged 0 to 14 and over 65 to the population aged between 15 and 64 years. 
45 See recently Commission, 2005c: 4. 
46 High Level Group, 2004b: 13. 
47 Commission, 2005c: 9. 
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The impact of demographic ageing was deemed very serious: According to projec-
tions, Europe will face a decreasing labour force even if the Lisbon targets are met,48 
growth rates will fall by the pure impact of ageing populations,49 and public expendi-
ture will grow (on EU average by 3.2 percentage points).50 The Commission wanted 
the problems connected to demographic ageing to be addressed in several contexts, 
including employment policy, social policies, health policies, policies against dis-
crimination and exclusion, and so forth (Commission, 1999b: 5). Actors, nonetheless, 
focused quickly on pension policy as pension policy is most immediately affected by 
population ageing while also being linked to employment and growth: Policies en-
couraging or discouraging early retirement directly influence employment rates. The 
expected increase in public spending (which, in turn, is expected to undermine sta-
bility) is supposed to be mainly due to pension expenditures. Finally, the pensions 
sector impresses by its sheer magnitude. Expenditures on social protection account 
for 27-28% of Community GDP, a large share of which is spent on public pensions.51 
However, pension policy was not solely conceived of as a root cause for certain prob-
lems: Even if, in many Member States, retirement incomes are mainly provided for 
by public pension schemes,52 the assets held by (occupational) pension funds and life 
assurance companies amount to more than 40% of the national GDP in some Member 
States.53 That, again, is an enormous segment of the capital market, a market waiting 
to be fully liberalised. 
From the beginning, reflections on the content of an EU pension policy aimed at find-
ing a new relationship between the three pillars of retirement provision. Future pen-
sion policy was deemed likely to result in greater reliance on second and third pillar 
provision (Commission, 1997b: I), with a view to alleviating the burden on public 
budgets and on those in work.54 In the context of pension policy, the term ‘modernis-
ing’ thus refers to a “sustainable mix of mutually supporting pension pillars based on 
legislation, collective agreement and private contract” (Commission, 1999b: 15). With 
respect to standards, especially income replacement rates, early EU documents re-
__________ 
 
 
 
48 High Level Group, 2004a: 21. According to Commission, 2000c: 5 the number of working-age people 
per pensioner will halve by the year 2050 going from 3,5 to 1,8 at EU level. 
49 High Level Group, 2004b: 13. 
50 Joint report, 2003: 63–64. 
51 Commission, 1999c: 5; Commission, 2003c: 3. See also the bleak comment in: Employment Taskforce, 
2003: 8: “The rapid ageing of the population is calling into question Europe’s ability to remain compe-
titive and achieve higher employment and economic growth in the future”. 
52 Social Protection Committee, 2005: 9. 
53 For details see Social Protection Committee, 2005: 13. In 1999, the Commission estimated that assets 
in the field of supplementary pensions amounted to 23% of EU GDP (Commission, 1999a: 10). 
54 On the concept of “pillared” pension provision see generally Ring and McKinnon, 2002. 
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mained vague. After a while, however, it became apparent that second and third pil-
lar income was meant to compensate for losses suffered from a reduction of first pil-
lar income.55 It was also clear from the beginning that striking a new balance between 
the pension pillars would enhance the need for a regulatory framework. The Com-
mission emphasised that the re-arrangement of pension pillars implied a shift in re-
sponsibility for retirement income from the governments towards employers and 
employees and towards individuals; as the importance of supplementary pensions 
increased, so would the need for governments to provide a secure environment for 
the sound operation of the supplementary funded schemes (Commission, 1997b: 5). 
Given the limitations of the Community’s powers, Community institutions opted for 
two strategies: With regard to first pillar pensions and the overall framework of the 
pension system, the Community introduced a (soft) cyclical procedure of setting 
common objectives, national reports on the implementation, benchmarking and iden-
tifying best practices, mutual learning, and monitoring (open method of co-
ordination).56 With regard to second and third pillar pensions, the Community was 
able to draw on legislative powers, given the fact that pension provision in these ar-
eas touches upon the internal market, the mobility of workers, and questions of gen-
der equality. 
3.2 Open method of co-ordination: Ends and means of pension policy 
3.2.1 Objectives 
The open method of co-ordination was formally introduced in the field of pensions 
in March 2001.57 The Commission launched a preparatory Communication in October 
2000 and another one in July 2001 to start the first cycle of the process (Commission, 
2000c, 2001b).58 
When the first cycle began it was beyond doubt that ‘sustainability’ was at the heart 
of the pension policy launched under the open method of co-ordination.59 Yet at first, 
__________ 
 
 
 
55 See, e.g., Commission, 2000d: 58–59. 
56 For details on the open method of co-ordination see Eichenhofer, 2002; Devetzi and Schmitt, 2002; 
Schulte, 2002; Heidel, 2003; Kohl and Vahlpahl, 2004; Devetzi, 2005. 
57 Stockholm European Council, March 2001, Presidency Conclusions, para. 32. 
58 The proposals were endorsed by the Social Protection Committee, the Economic Policy Committee, 
the Council and the European Council. See Social Protection Committee and Economic Policy Commit-
tee, 2001; Göteborg European Council, June 2001, Presidency Conclusions, para. 43; Laeken European 
Council, December 2001, para. 30. 
59 See the first reference to sustainability in: Santa Maria da Feira European Council, June 2000, Presi-
dency Conclusions, para. 35: “as regards the future evolution of social protection, particular attention 
should be given to the sustainability of pension schemes”. 
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there was some confusion about what exactly was meant by ‘sustainability’ of pen-
sion systems, especially how to balance social policy standards, e.g., the presumed 
level of retirement income, against budgetary soundness: Should budgetary sound-
ness have priority over decency of retirement incomes? Eventually, the actors agreed 
that pension policy promoted under the open method of co-ordination should be ba-
sed on 11 objectives, grouped under three headings: Adequacy of pensions, financial 
sustainability of pension systems, and modernisation of pension systems in response 
to changing needs of the economy, society and individuals. Adequacy of pensions 
refers to ensuring that pensioners are not placed at risk of poverty and, through pub-
lic or private arrangements, can enjoy a decent standard of living. It also refers to 
promoting solidarity within and between generations. Financial sustainability is to 
be achieved through a bundle of employment-related measures, such as high em-
ployment rates or disincentives to early retirement, and through public pension re-
form curbing benefits. Modernisation of pension systems refers to adapting the sys-
tems to modern working and family patterns, such as part-time jobs, changing jobs, 
career breaks, responsibilities with regard to care, and others. 
Member States were requested to present national strategy reports by the end of 
2002, elaborating on how they expected to meet the common objectives. A first joint 
report of the Commission and the Council evaluating the Member States’ policies 
was delivered in the Spring of 2003 (Joint Report, 2003). 
3.2.2 Outcomes 
So far, the outcome of the first cycle of the open method of co-ordination is meagre.60 
It remains unclear where pension policy is heading to, and many Member States 
proved reluctant when it came to the implementation of policy objectives. 
First: Eichenhofer (2002: 330) assumed that the open method of co-ordination would 
encourage actors to reflect upon the basic goals of pension provision: Is pension 
about preventing poverty, is it about maintaining a certain standard of living achie-
ved during employment, or is it about solidarity and equity? The first cycle did not 
bring any answers. The joint report of the Commission and the Council concluded 
that all Member States provided a minimum income guarantee for older people, ei-
ther through their public pension schemes or through social assistance (Joint Report, 
2003: 31). The report also stated that maintaining a certain level of living standard 
was an objective shared by Member States (ibd.). The report noted however, that 
__________ 
 
 
 
60 The second cycle of the process was initiated in January 2005. See Social Protection Committee and 
Economic Policy Committee, 2005. Member States were requested to submit their National Strategy 
Reports by July 2005. 
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Member States employed very different methods to achieve this: In some Member 
States, high income replacement rates were ensured by public pension schemes, 
whereas in other Member States high income replacement rates completely de-
pended on second and third pillar income (ibd.: 32). For the time being, national 
strategy reports would not allow systematic comparisons of current and future re-
placement levels in the Member States (ibd.: 36). Finally, the report observed a grow-
ing tendency for statutory schemes to become less generous (Joint Report, 2003: 35). 
Yet, the report did not even try to guess where the government’s responsibility ought 
to end: Was responsibility supposed to end when — after a full career based on aver-
age earnings — first pillar income reached the poverty line or are governments ex-
pected to provide for more? The report remains silent on that point. 
Second: The joint report of the Commission and the Council admits that the growing 
importance of second and third pillar schemes entails a growing need for a regula-
tory framework, in particular with respect to affordability of the schemes, efficiency, 
and security, e.g. in cases of insolvency (Joint Report, 2003: 79). The report addresses 
many important questions, such as: Should legislation ensure that second and third 
pillar schemes reach high coverage rates? What exactly is the role of solidarity and 
redistribution in the context of second and third pillar schemes? How are the risks (of 
low returns or inflation) to be shared between employers and employees, the ones 
that contribute, and the ones that eventually receive the payments? According to 
which standards are the managers supposed to invest the assets? How to minimise 
the risk of insolvency? How to ensure transparency? The conclusions of the report 
(ibd.: 86) signal, however, that, with a few exceptions, the Community is not yet pre-
pared to set any common standards. The concepts of solidarity, redistribution, and 
risk management remain utterly elusive. The exceptions relate to the management of 
pension funds, the portability of rights, tax problems, and gender equality. These 
issues will be dealt with shortly. 
Third: State performance with regard to the financial sustainability of pension sys-
tems was quite openly criticised by the Commission and the Council. The joint report 
(2003: 61, 75) concluded that employment rates, especially among older workers, 
were still low and that further pension reforms were urgently needed in most Mem-
ber States. Criticism grew even stronger in the course of 2003 and 2004, when it be-
came undeniable that most Member States would miss the Lisbon employment tar-
gets, unless all actors stepped up their efforts.61 In November 2004, a working group 
__________ 
 
 
 
61 Commission, 2003: 11; Employment Taskforce, 2003; High Level Group, 2004a; High Level Group, 
2004b. 
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chaired by Wim Kok drew a very dark picture of Europe’s future: “If Europe cannot 
adapt, cannot modernise its systems and cannot increase growth and employment 
fast enough then it will be impossible to sustain these choices [i.e.: the European so-
cial model]”. The Community acted promptly and determined. In the Spring of 2003, 
the European Employment Strategy was revised in order to synchronise economic 
and employment policy (introduction of a parallel three years cycle, re-arrangement 
of objectives).62 The various open methods of co-ordination employed in the field of 
social protection (covering social inclusion, pensions, and health and long-term care) 
were streamlined and reorganised in the Fall of 2003.63 In the Spring of 2005, the Lis-
bon process was re-launched with a clear emphasis on growth and employment.64 
The impact of all these changes remains to be seen. 
3.3 Legislative acts: Completing the internal market 
The Community acted very differently in the arena of its genuine legislative powers. 
The Commission, in particular, took an unambiguous stand. Actors on EU level were 
preoccupied by the fact that the assets held by institutions managing second and 
third pillar pension schemes constitute a large segment of the financial market, a 
market that was, with the exception of the market for life assurances, all but fully 
integrated. For a variety of reasons, the situation was deemed detrimental (Commis-
sion, 1991; Commission, 1997b; Commission, 1999a): Individuals were not really able 
to choose the scheme best suited to their needs, and institutions were not really able 
to choose the investments yielding the highest returns, since both were tied to do-
mestic markets. Therefore, the Commission fought fiercely for the completion of the 
internal market, primarily in the field of occupational pension schemes. Social policy 
goals played a minor role in that setting. Advantages for future pensioners (e.g. an 
increase in their income caused by an increase in investment returns) were welcome, 
but they were welcome as a by-product of the completion of the internal market 
(Stevens, Gieselink and van Buggenhout, 2002: 32). The Commission made four sig-
__________ 
 
 
 
62 See Commission, 2003a, endorsed by the Brussels European Council, March 2003, Presidency 
Conclusions, para. 41. 
63 See Commission, 2003c proposing to switch to a 3 years cycle synchronised with the cycles in the 
field of employment and economy, to merge the reporting and monitoring procedures in the area of 
social inclusion, pensions and health and care into a single procedure, operating under an integrated 
set of objectives, and to replace three joint reports of the Commission and the Council by a single re-
port, covering all relevant issues. The proposal was endorsed by the Brussels European Council, Oc-
tober 2003, Presidency Conclusions, p. 8 and adopted by the Council on 20 October 2003, Bulletin EU 
10-2003, 1.3.23. 
64 Commission, 2005a, endorsed by the Brussels European Council, March 2005, Presidency Conclu-
sions, para. 8. 
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nificant moves: Three aimed at setting market forces free, one aimed at safeguarding 
gender equality in the context of services. 
3.3.1 Managing funds 
The Commission’s move on the activities of institutions for occupational retirement 
provision (2000b) proved to be the most successful. 
For more than 10 years, the Commission had been arguing that the growing impor-
tance of second and third pillar pension schemes would lead to an increase in funds 
held by the institutions managing the assets (Commission, 1991: I). Since a further 
growth in government bonds was deemed unlikely, investment in equities and cor-
porate or private bonds would have to increase to absorb the capital available. That 
was seen as a huge chance for European industry, a chance that was, however, un-
dermined by national provisions. Under national law, pension funds were often 
obliged to invest high percentages of their assets in domestic government bonds; 
they were also often obliged to hold certain percentages of their assets in certain cur-
rencies. Those rules — so the Commission complained — hampered cross-country 
investment as well as investment in equities. The Commission conceded that today’s 
consumers and tomorrow’s pensioners ought to be protected since all investment 
decisions entailed risks. The Commission was, nonetheless, convinced that national 
provisions on investment and supervision went beyond what was necessary for con-
sumers’ protection. National provisions effectively favoured investment strategies 
yielding lower returns than strategies allowing for long-term investment in equities 
and in risk capital markets. 
In 2003, the Commission finally succeeded. The Council adopted the Directive on 
pension funds,65 setting minimum standards for the managing of pension funds. Un-
der the Directive, Member States are obliged to ensure that institutions for occupa-
tional retirement provision operate under minimum prudential standards, including 
the duty to register in a national register, the duty to ensure management by persons 
of good repute, the duty of obtain certification of all technical provisions by special-
ists, the obligation to provide specified information to scheme members, and the du-
ty to accept supervision by an independent authority. The Directive also requires 
Member States to adopt qualitative rather than quantitative investment rules: In 
principle, pension funds are supposed to invest in accordance with the ‘prudent per-
son’ rule, implying that all assets are to be invested in the best interests of members 
and beneficiaries and in such a manner as to ensure the security, quality, liquidity 
__________ 
 
 
 
65 Directive 2003/41/EC of 3 June 2003 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupa-
tional retirement provision, O.J. 20003 L 235/10. 
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and profitability of the portfolio as a whole, that assets shall be predominantly in-
vested on regulated markets, that assets shall be properly diversified, and that the 
investment in the sponsoring enterprise shall not be more than 5% of the portfolio.66 
Member States are explicitly not allowed to require pension funds to invest in par-
ticular assets,67 and they are not allowed to prevent pension funds from investment 
in risk capital markets.68 Cross-border activities are to be accepted by the home 
Member State and the host Member State, though these activities are subject to an 
authorisation by the home Member State and the supervision by the host Member 
State.69 The Directive was to be implemented by 23 September 2005. 
3.3.2 Mobility 
Another initiative of the Commission dealt with barriers to the mobility of workers 
(Commission, 1997b: 14; 1999a: 26). That initiative was less successful. 
Certain characteristics of second pillar pension schemes tend to discourage employ-
ees to leave their employers and to take up employment with another employer 
(Commission, 1997b: 14; Commission, 1999a: 5): Age requirements or waiting periods 
for membership and vesting periods for the acquisition of pension rights penalise 
employees who leave the system early. If employees leave employment prior to the 
specified time, they might be prevented from membership or from acquiring rights, 
as the case may be. These early leavers leave without gaining anything out of the 
pension scheme. Leaving employees who have in fact acquired rights under an occu-
pational pension scheme, may loose these rights simply because they move to an-
other Member State. If early leavers keep their rights or are able to opt for a cash 
transfer, their rights are to be evaluated (e.g. in order to calculate the amount of the 
cash transfer). And it might be that the early leavers are disadvantaged by the for-
mula applied because future pay rises are not taken into account (though that would 
have been the case if they had stayed with their former employer) or because their 
entitlements are not indexed. Finally, it might happen that the pension scheme (of 
the former employer) does not provide for cross-border payment of benefits. Thus, 
the rights of all (former) employees who chose to move to another Member State af-
ter retirement are in effect suspended. 
__________ 
 
 
 
66 Article 18(1)of the Directive. 
67 Ibd., Article 18(3). 
68 Ibd., Article 18(5)(c). Within certain limits, Member States may, however, still lay down quantitative 
rules, provided these rules are “prudentially justified”. For details see Article 18(5) of the Directive. 
69 Ibd., Article 20. 
 
 
 
19 
Although the Commission pushed hard for a removal of all those barriers to the free 
movement of workers, many of them still exist. A 1998 Directive70 obliges Member 
States to ensure the preservation of acquired rights under a second pillar scheme for 
employees who moved to another Member State if and insofar as preservation also 
takes place for scheme members who leave their employer and remain in the Mem-
ber State. That is not much. In addition to that, the Directive obliges Member States 
to ensure cross-border payments of benefits and to ensure that contributions for pos-
ted workers are accepted during the period of the posting in another Member State. 
The Directive does not deal with vesting periods, the evaluation of dormant rights, or 
the calculation of capital transfers. However, it seems as if the Commission has now 
been able to mediate a consensus amongst all relevant actors with a view to reducing 
vesting periods to only one year and with a view to adequate common actuarial 
principles for the evaluation of dormant rights and capital transfers (Commission, 
2002; Commission, 2003d). Future action, though, might be confined to defined con-
tribution schemes. 
3.3.3 Taxation 
Initiatives on tax obstacles relating to second and third pillar pensions were the least 
successful. There has been no legislative action at all. 
Tax issues arise when workers residing and employed in one Member State join or 
stay in a pension scheme established in another Member State: Are contributions to 
the scheme tax deductible if contributions to schemes established in the country of 
residence are (scenario one)? Some Member States say no. Tax issues also arise when 
an employee and member of a pension schemes decides to move to another Member 
State after retirement: Is the income that he or she receives under the scheme liable to 
taxation even if contributions have already been taxed (scenario two)? Some Member 
States say yes. It seems obvious that scenario one hampers cross-border mobility as 
well as cross-border provision of services: Why would anyone join or stay in a pen-
sion scheme established in another Member State if contributions to the scheme are 
not tax deductible whereas contributions to domestic schemes are? Scenario two is 
more complex: If a pensioner leaves a Member State where contributions and returns 
are exempt from tax but benefits are taxed, and moves to a Member State taxing con-
tributions but exempting benefits, neither contributions nor benefits are being taxed. 
If migration takes place the other way round, contributions as well as benefits will be 
liable to taxation. 
__________ 
 
 
 
70 Directive 98/49/EC of 29 June 1998 on safeguarding the supplementary pension rights of employed 
and self-employed persons moving within the Community, O.J. 1998 L 209/46. 
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The Commission’s move against tax obstacles (1999a, 2001a) was strongly backed by 
the Court of Justice. For several times, the Court held that the (discriminatory) re-
fusal of deductibility of contributions paid to pension providers established in an-
other Member State constituted a restriction of the freedom to provide services (Arti-
cle 49 of the Treaty) that could not be justified by the coherence of national tax law.71 
The Commission (2001a: 13, 19) suggested to adopt a set of Community rules further 
elaborating on the principles affirmed by the Court. The Commission also proposed 
that all Member States should, on a voluntary basis, opt for a tax system ensuring 
deductibility of contributions and returns while taxing the payment of benefits. 
Though the Council reached favourable conclusions in the Fall of 2001,72 no further 
action was taken. The Commission was, therefore, left with one option only, namely 
to monitor national tax rules and to bring the matter before the Court of Justice when 
national tax law is not in line with the Treaty obligations.73 
3.3.4 Gender equality 
One of the Commission’s initiatives pertaining to private pensions was not exclu-
sively driven by the idea of completing the internal market. 
The proposal for a Directive implementing gender equality in the access to and the 
supply of goods and services (Commission, 2003e) included a draft Article uncondi-
tionally prohibiting the use of sex as a factor in the calculation of premiums and be-
nefits for the purpose of insurance and related financial services in all new contracts 
concluded after a specified date (draft Article 4). In its explanatory memorandum, 
the Commission specifically referred to the recent “trend in Member States to replace 
or supplement state provision in the field of pensions by private insurance”.74 That 
trend was considered worrisome since it was, so the Commission claimed, accompa-
nied by a shift from sex-neutral state pension provision to a pension provision fur-
thering gender inequality, by either openly differentiating according to sex or being 
less mindful of the special needs of women. The Commission wanted to counter-act 
this trend. But when the Commission’s proposal was made public, it was met with 
considerable resistance by the insurance industry in Germany as well as in other 
__________ 
 
 
 
71 See Court of Justice, judgement of 28 April 1998, C-118/96 Safir, 1998 ECR I 1897; Court of Justice, 
judgement of 3 October 2002, C-136/00 Danner, 2002 ECR I 8147; Court of Justice, judgement of 26 
June 2003, C-422/01 Försäkringsaktiebolaget Skandia, 2003 ECR I 6817; but see also Court of Justice, 
judgement of 28 January 1992, C-204/90 Bachmann, 1992 ECR I 249. For an overview on the Court’s 
case law see Pieters, 2001 and Richter, 2003. 
72 Bulletin EU 10-2001, 1.3.36. 
73 See, e.g., the actions against Denmark and Belgium, O.J. 2004 C 190/3 and O.J. 2005 C 57/17. 
74 Commission, 2003e: 8. 
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Member States.75 Eventually, the Council adopted an escape clause securing enor-
mous leeway for reluctant Member States.76 Under Article 5(2) of the 2004 Directive77 
Member States may permit “proportionate differences in individuals’ premiums and 
benefits where the use of sex is a determining factor in the assessment of risk based 
on relevant and accurate actuarial and statistical data”. 
In the end, therefore, insurance companies had their way. Insurance industry had 
always been arguing that gender-related differences in premiums or benefits were 
factually justified as the risks pertaining to men (as a group) and women (as a group) 
differed widely; in the field of pensions, differences in premiums or benefits would 
simply mirror real differences in life expectancy. The Commission (2003e: 8) did not 
try to dispute statistical data. The Commission simply held that factual differences, 
e.g. in life expectancy, were “clearly morally unacceptable as a reason” for differences 
in treatment (ibd.). However, arguments based on moral standards had little weight 
when governments faced pressure from the insurance industry. 
4 Conclusions 
What is the overall picture of EU pension policy? What shape does EU pension pol-
icy take? Four conclusions can be drawn from what has been said before. 
First: In the years to come, Member States will be under increased pressure exerted 
by the EU to modernise their pension systems. The metaphor of the ‘triangle’ (con-
necting social policy, employment policy, and economic policy) helped creating a 
framework for subordinating social policy to economic and employment policy. Un-
der that framework, pension expenditures are perceived as a major threat to growth 
and stability. If the re-launch of the Lisbon process indeed bears consequences, most 
Member States will be openly shamed for their reluctance to strive for pension cuts. 
__________ 
 
 
 
75 See, e.g., ‘Europa soll Vorreiter für Unisex-Tarife werden; Unternehmen tragen die Beweislast; Versi-
cherungsbranche lehnt neuen Gesetzesvorschlag ab‘ [Europe supposed to take the lead with respect to 
gender-neutral premiums; companies will bear the burden of proof; insurance industry opposes draft 
Directive], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 November 2003, p. 16; J. Jahn, ‘Im Gleichheitswahn‘ [Un-
der the delusion of equality], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 November 2003, p. 11; ‘Wenig Unter-
stützung für Unisex-Tarife‘ [Little support for gender-neutral premiums], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung, 29 May 2004. 
76 ‘Unisex-Tarife sind in der EU vom Tisch; Kompromißvorschlag; Einigung im EU-Ministerrat auf die 
neue Richtlinie dennoch unwahrscheinlich‘ [Gender-neutral premiums stopped at EU level; compro-
mise reached; Council agreement nonetheless improbable], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 October 
2004, p. 11. 
77 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, O.J. 2004 L 373/37. 
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Second: There is no doubt that, in most Member States, public schemes will remain 
the most important source of retirement income. Nonetheless, the EU will continue 
to push for a further shift in the balance of the three pension pillars, favouring sec-
ond and third pillar schemes. If first pillar income is in fact lowered, there is no other 
way to sustain what is called the ‘adequacy of pensions’. 
Third: EU institutions admit the need for a regulatory framework with respect to se-
cond and third pillar schemes. For the time being, regulation adopted at EU level is 
dominated by the idea of unleashing market forces. In other words: Regulation is 
about removing barriers with regard to the free flow of capital, the free provision of 
services, and the free movement of persons. Regulation primarily aims at creating, 
not correcting markets (see Grande, in this volume). What was used to be called so-
cial rights (understood as rights — addressed to the state — to be granted legally de-
fined benefits) is partially replaced by legal provisions obliging private providers of 
services to pay attention to consumers‘ interests. But: Consumers’ interests are taken 
into account by Community law only if safeguarding those interests does not in-
fringe upon market freedoms too heavily. More than ever, adequacy of pensions will 
depend on the outcomes of the capital market. If and how the markets will respond 
to demographic ageing is still difficult to predict. If second and third pillar schemes 
yield low returns in the long run, consequences will have to be shouldered by indi-
viduals, not by the state. 
Fourth: Pension systems heavily relying on second and third pillar schemes pay less 
attention to the principles of solidarity and equity. Second and third pillar schemes 
are scarcely characterised by redistributive elements, especially if the trend towards 
defined contribution schemes persists. Those schemes tend to disadvantage women 
since there are basically no mechanisms compensating for career breaks caused by 
the fact that they take care of children or other disabled relatives. And: Second and 
third pillar schemes will less effectively prevent the risk of poverty in old age. Em-
pirical data show that the take-up of occupational and personal pensions by low in-
come families is extremely low. Less well off citizens simply cannot afford more sav-
ings. There is, thus, a high probability that inequalities among pensioners will in-
crease distinctly in the long run. It is to be seen if and how ‘Social Europe’ will re-
spond to this tendency. 
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